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NOTES
activities. Because of lax enforcement of state antitrust statutes99 and
the interpretation of these statutes to exclude services, however, these
price-fixing activities are generally not proscribed. Neither do fixed
prices reasonably relate to shop sanitation. Thus the individual's right
to contract outweighs any remote benefit to the public and an infringe-
ment upon this right violates state constitutional protection. Since the
barbers have not demonstrated that the breach of antitrust and freedom
of contract principles falls within the legally recognized exceptions to these
principles, state courts occasionally do and logically should always re-
fuse to uphold or enforce price-fixing attempts within the barber trade
by master barber agreement, union activity, or legislative enactment.
THE FORMALITIES ESSENTIAL TO A VALID MARRIAGE
IN INDIANA
In 1957 the Indiana General Assembly declared that "all marriages
known as 'common law marriages'" contracted subsequent to January 1,
1958, should be null and void.' By adopting this terminology the legis-
lature has provided that a marriage founded solely on a contract per verba
de praesenti, cohabitation as husband and wife, and community reputa-
tion2 is invalid. The Indiana courts will, therefore, be called upon to de-
cide which of the existing statutory provisions relating to licensing and
ceremony3 are essential to the formation of a valid marriage. In addi-
tion, the courts may be presented with the problem of whether a marriage
may be sustained which was contracted in accordance with the statutory
provisions but to which an impediment unknown to the parties and later
removed existed at the time of solemnization.4 These problems are of
more than academic interest, for, regardless of the frequency with which
99. State antitrust laws are characterized by their lax enforcement. See Note, 32
COLUm. L. REv. 347 (1932); Note, 43 ILL. L. REv. 205 (1948); Note, 1951 Wis. L. REV.
657.
1. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-111 (Supp. 1957).
2. These were the three requisites of a valid common law marriage announced in
Anderson v. Anderson, 235 Ind. 113, 131 N.E.2d 301 (1956). Cohabitation and com-
munity reputation might be sufficient to allow an inference that there was a contract
in the present tense in the absence of testimony by one of the parties as to what the
agreement was. Where the contract was written and witnessed, reputation might not
be required.
3. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 44-205, -206, -208 to -212, -301, -304 to -306 (1952) ; 44-201,
-202, -207, -213, -303 (Supp. 1957).
4. For graphic illustrations of possible problems of the latter type see Small,
So We Killed the Common Law Marriage or, Did We Kill the Conniwn Law Marriagel,
Res Gestae, Sept. 1957, p. 1.
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they may arise, to the litigants the stakes may be high in relation to in-
heritance, workmen's compensation, social security benefits, or alimony.
The broad scope of the problem of determining which of the statu-
tory provisions are essential results from a legislative declaration which
is directed at what cannot constitute a valid marriage, rather than one
directed at what must be accomplished to constitute a valid marriage. It
might be argued on first impression that by abolishing common law
marriage and leaving only statutory provisions to regulate the mode of
entering the marital status, the legislature obviously intended compliance
with all the provisions. However, when litigation comes before the
court, the issue will not be whether the legislature intended compliance,
but what sanction the legislature provided to enforce its intent.5 This is
to be found not in assumption, but in what the legislature has expressly
stated or clearly implied. Some further act of the legislature might then
be sought.
Concurrently with its pronouncement on common law marriage the
Indiana assembly repealed the provision which stated: "No marriage
shall be void or voidable for the want of license or other formality re-
quired by law, if either of the parties thereto believed it to be a legal
marriage at the time."'  Thus, it might seem a fair implication that a
marriage is to be void for want of any formality. However, the breadth
of the section itself, which includes "void" and "voidable," clouds the
implication. It suggests that when the law was enacted in 1852 the legis-
lature was not concerned with any distinctions between statutory require-
ments, nor with the quality of the requirements as a body, but simply in-
tended to preclude the possibility of amy formality presenting any kind of
obstacle to a common law marriage. And this was the result of the
statute when brought before the courts.7 Reasoning, therefore, which
would assign to the repeal of the section anything beyond merely remov-
ing the authorization of common law marriage would be on the specula-
tive ground of finding more significance in the repeal than there was in
the enactment.8
5. For a discussion of legislative controls and sanctions see text accompaning
note 123 infra.
6. 1 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, ch. 67, § 7, at 362, repealed by Ind. Acts 1957, ch. 78, § 2,
at 138.
7. See Castor v. McDole, 80 Ind. App. 556, 562, 148 N.E. 643, 645 (1923) and
Lowrance v. Lowrance, 95 Ind. App. 345, 356, 182 N. E. 273, 276 (1932).
8. The opinions in the following cases illustrate inferences which may be derived
from legislative repeal or amendment: Norman v. Norman, 121 Cal. 620, 54 Pac. 143
(1898) (denying the validity of common law marriage) ; Schumacher v. Great Northern
Ry. Co., 23 N.D. 231, 136 N.W. 85 (1912) (denying the validity of common law mar-
riage.) It is interesting to note that the legality of common law marriage was never
seriously questioned in Indiana. After its early acceptance, the instant statute was
NOTES
The General Assembly also acted during the 1957 session to revise
the laws pertaining to issuance of a license, parental consent to the mar-
riage of minors, and procurement of a pre-marital blood test.9 But the
changes, although substantial, did not deal with the essentiality of com-
pliance with the provisions. It follows, then, that the attention of the
Indiana courts will be directed primarily to the statute abolishing com-
mon law marriage and to the specific statutory formalities. Further, the
aid to interpretation which the Indiana courts may derive from other
jurisdictions will be limited since Illinois"0 is the only other jurisdiction
in the United States which has abolished common law marriage by the
sole means adopted by the Indiana legislature."
Before the specific Indiana statutory provisions are examined, two
descriptive terms should be noted: "directory" and "mandatory." Al-
though these terms are generally applied to statutes relating to the per-
formance of a public duty, they have become common labels of statutes
prescribing the procedures for contracting marriage whether the statute
is addressed to a public official or to private parties contemplating mar-
riage." The significant characteristic of such statutes is that they pur-
port to impose an affirmative obligation. When disregard of such a
statute involves no invalidating consequence, although the disregard may
be punishable by fine and/or imprisonment, the statute is deemed "direc-
tory." 3 Conversely, when such disregard renders the event to which the
statute relates void, the statute is deemed "mandatory."' 4
The directory-mandatory terminology leads to the conclusion that
an attempted marriage is either valid or void. A "voidable" marriage' 5
enacted insuring its continuance. See Trimble v. Trimble, 2 Ind. 76, 78 (1850) and
Fleming v. Fleming, 8 Blackf. 234 (Ind. 1846). There is, therefore, no judicial rationale
concerning the conflict between statute and common law which might present a con-
venient starting place for the courts when considering the present problem of determining
essential requirements.
9. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 44-201, -202, -203 (Supp. 1957).
10. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 89, § 4 (Smith-Hurd 1956). In fact the Illinois legislature
in addition to abolishing "common law marriage" issued a policy directive specifically
addressed to the essentiality of the license and ceremony which the Illinois courts have
ignored as will be seen below.
11. States other than Indiana which have terminated recognition of common law
marriage by statute have attacked the problem by affirmatively stating that certain
statutory formalities are essential to a valid marriage. See notes 128-31 infra and
acompanying text. See also Appendix.
12. See Appendix.
13. BLAcK, LAW DICTIONARY 547 (4th ed. 1951).
14. Id. at 1114.
15. In general a void marriage is subject to direct and collateral attack by anyone
at any time in any court or proceeding in which the fact of marriage is material, and
no civil rights ever accrue under it. A voidable marriage may be set aside only in a
direct and appropriate proceeding during the joint lives of the parties. Civil rights accrue
under it until it is invalidated. 35 Am. JuR. Marriage § 46 (1941) ; 55 CJ.S. Marriage
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is not included within the conceptual framework of this terminology and,
in general, has not been found by courts to be a consequence of failure to
comply with statutory formalities. Voidability is only applicable to the
statutory formalities where one of the parties is under age or where com-
pliance or noncompliance by one party involves fraud, duress, or coercion
as to the other party."8
That a marriage to be valid must in the future be solemnized would
seem, on first impression, to allow no question. However, there is no
Indiana statute which explicitly states that a ceremony is essential. The
statutes establish that certain persons may solemnize a marriage,"' that a
license must be procured before parties are joinwd in irarriage,8 and that
solemnizing a marriage contrary to statute will subject the officiant to
criminal penalties. 9 Still, the result of essentiality seems inescapable.
Informal marriage has been abolished; there remains only formal mar-
riage, the distinguishing feature of which throughout history has been
the ceremony." The Illinois court seems to assume that a ceremony is
essential to a valid marriage, but there is no opinion explicitly discussing
the point.2 The Maryland court when confronted by statutes of a tenor
similar to those of Indiana held a ceremony essential to a valid marriage
on the ground, in part, that the statutes expressed an "expectation" that
all marriages would be celebrated by religious ceremony.22
The Indiana statute which enumerates those persons who may solem-
nize a marriage continues: "Provided, That no marriage, legal in other
respects, shall be void on account of the incapacity of the person solem-
nizing the same."2  The courts of Virginia and West Virginia have
§ 35 (1948); 2 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS
1353 (1921). See generally Note, 33 IND. L.. 80 (1957).
16. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-106 (1952) (voidable for fraud or want of age);
Commissioners' Note to § 23 of UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND MARRIAGE LICENSE ACT (1911)
(found in 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 473, 474 (1942) (superseded)). For a dis-
cussion of the early common law finding of a voidable inarriage because of the canonical
impediments of consanguinity, affinity, and impotence see 55 CJ.S. Marriage § 35
(1948).
17. IN. ANN. STAT. § 44-301 (1952).
18. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-201 (Supp. 1957).
19. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-304 (1952). That this section has any meaning today
may be doubted since nowhere is the form of ceremony prescribed and since §§ 44-305
and 44-211 proscribe specific offenses.
20. See KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 28 (3d ed. 1946).
21. See Haderaski v. Haderaski, 415 Ill. 118, 112 N.E.2d 714 (1953); Wilson v.
Cook, 256 Ill. 460, 100 N.E. 222 (1912).
22. Knapp v. Knapp, 149 Md. 263, 131 At. 329 (1925). Additional grounds were
that the English common law required a ceremony and that the custom of the people of
the state had acquired the force of law. This case follows the leading case of Denison
v. Denison, 35 Md. 361 (1872).
23. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-301 (1952).
seized upon similar provisions to hold a ceremony essential to the validity
of a marriage."4 Their reasoning was that affirmative specification of
circumstances in which non-compliance with statutory formalities would
not invalidate a marriage excluded all other exceptions to invalidity, and
thus failure to have a marriage solemnized at all would invalidate it.
This, in effect, is the statutory rule of construction, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, or as the West Virginia court put it, expressum facit
cessare tacitum. The statutes of these two states were not held to imply
that all statutory formalities were essential. Essentiality was limited
solely to those formalities to which the statutes alluded, the ceremony and,
in the Virginia and West Virginia statutes, procurement of a license.
This analysis of the legislative purpose might well be followed by the
Indiana courts upon a finding or presumption that the legislature knew
the contents of the statutes which existed when it declared common law
marriage a nullity.
25
In the final analysis, the most compelling argument for the essen-
tiality of a ceremony would seem to be the one first discussed. Informal
marriage has been declared null and void. Some formal step must there-
fore be taken to contract a valid marriage, and the foundation of formal
marriage throughout history has been the ceremony. No jurisdiction in
the United States which has ceased to recognize common law marriage
has ever held a marriage valid in the absence of a ceremony.28
If it is found by the Indiana courts that some type of ceremony is
essential to a valid marriage, the form of the ceremony will present no
validity problem, for nowhere do the statutes prescribe any set form.
One statute relating to the ceremony prescribes those persons who may
solemnize a marriage.28 But in a proviso clause, as previously noted, in-
capacity of the of ficiant is held not to invalidate a marriage. Thus, the
24. Of field v. Davis, 100 Va. 250, 40 S.E. 910 (1902); Beverlin v. Beverlin, 29
W. Va. 732, 3 S.F. 36 (1887).
25. All of the Indiana marirage statutes enacted prior to 1957 must necessarily
be interpreted as if re-enacted at the time of the abolition of common law marriage.
This follows because these early statutes took their meaning in a context which included
the provision which authorized common law marriage, 1 IND. REV. STAT. 1852, ch. 67,
§ 7, at 362. For example, the proviso concerning want of authority of the officiant could
hardly have been interpreted when originally enacted to imply that a marriage was void
unless solemnized since the statute which was then in effect expressly stated that no
marriage was void for want of any formality.
26. For a listing of those states which do not recognize common law marriage
see Appendix.
27. However, the absence of a prescribed form may permit the issue to arise as to
whether there was a marriage ceremony at all when, for example, a litigant contends
that the ritual in question was a marriage blessing. See Haderaski v. Haderaski, 415
II. 118, 112 N.E.2d 714 (1953).
28. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-301 (1952).
NOTES 647
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essentiality question here is expressly answered. Such a provision, mak-
ing immaterial a want of authority in the of ficiant, is common in the
United States.29 The wording of the Indiana provision, however, is
unique in its failure to establish any qualifications to holding such a
marriage valid. Statutes of other jurisdictions generally provide that
want of authority in the of ficiant will not invalidate a marriage if the
officiant professes to be authorized and if at least one of the persons
married by him acted in good faith.3" The implication of such a statute
would clearly seem to be that where the marital parties act in bad faith
the marriage is invalid.3 The possibility that the Indiana courts might
inject "good faith" as a requirement into the Indiana statute may be
better appreciated in the context of the following discussion.3 2
The Indiana statutes recite that when an officiant solemnizes a mar-
riage he shall give the original marriage certificate to the person married
by him and within thirty days file the duplicate certificate and the mar-
riage license with the county clerk. The county clerk is then directed to
record the certificate and the license.3" Failure of the officiant to act
promptly, or to act at all, or failure of the clerk to record may again
present the issue of essentiality of compliance to the validity of the mar-
riage.34 In Louisiana, where common law marriage is not recognized,35
29. E.g., MIcH. ComP. LAWS § 551.16 (1948); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-114 (1943);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-5 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-31 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 4693 (1955) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.33 (1957).
30. For example, NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-114 (1943) states:
No marriage solemnized before any person professing to be a justice
of the peace, or a minister of the gospel, shall be deemed or adjudged to be
void, nor shall the validity thereof be in any way affected on account of
any want of jurisdiciton or authority in such supposed justice or minister;
Provided, the marriage be consummated with a full belief on the part of the
persons so married, or either of them, that they have been lawfully joined
in marriage.
31. But see Commissioners' Note to § 23 of UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND MARRIAGE
LIcENSE AcT (1911) (found in 9 UNIFoR LAWS ANNOTATED 473, 474 (1942) (super-
seded)) which states that for violation of similar requirements it is sufficient that the
marriage be voidable within the divorce laws of the state, i.e., for fraud, force, or
coercion.
32. If the lack of a good faith requirement seems anomalous today in a context
of formal marriage, it must be remembered that when the provision was enacted in 1897,
the context was common law marriage, and it consequently was immaterial to the
validity of a marriage whether it was solemnized by a minister or a druggist or whether
it was not solemnized at all. Therefore, at that time the belief of the parties as to the
authority of the person solemnizing the marriage was immaterial. It should be noted,
however, that one who undertakes to solemnize a marriage when he is not authorized
is subject to fine and imprisonment. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-305 (1952).
33. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-303 (Supp. 1957).
34. A fine for failure to return the certificate and license is provided by IND. ANN.
STAT. § 44-306 (1952).
35. Succession of Gibson, 186 La. 723, 173 So. 185 (1937); it re Raphael, 117
La. 967, 42 So. 470 (1906) ; Holmes v. Holmes, 6 La. 463 (1834).
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a minister instead of submitting the marriage certificate and license to
the issuing authority as provided by law36 delivered them to one of the
parties whose marriage he had just solemnized. The federal district
court held that when "a license was regularly issued and a wedding cere-
mony performed by a regularly ordained minister," there was "substan-
tial compliance with the law of Louisiana, and the marriage was good and
valid."37  (Emphasis added.) The court did not define "substantial
compliance."
The rationale of the Missouri court in dealing with a license provi-
sion is significant to the present discussion of the ceremonial formali-
ties.3 In a prosecution for bigamy the accused asserted that the first
alleged marriage was void because the license had been issued by a Justice
of the Peace, rather than by the Recorder of Deeds as provided by law.
The Missouri statutes stated that a "common law marriage" was void,39
and that no marriage should be "recognized as valid" in the absence of
a license and ceremony,4" but that want of authority in a minister would
not affect the validity of a marriage if either of the parties fully believed
that they were lawfully joined in marriage. 1 The Missouri court held
that the accused's first marriage was sufficient to support the convic-
tion; that it was not void. The significance of the opinion for present
purposes is that it interpreted the provision as to want of authority in
the officiant to mean that all that was required by the marriage regulation
was apparent compliance, which under the facts before the court would
seem to mean that simply procuring a license, regardless of from what
public source, was apparent compliance. The court did not mention the
good faith provision of the statute it interpreted, but the parties to the
marriage must be taken to have acted in good faith since the trial court
instructed the jury that in order to find a valid marriage and conse-
quently convict the defendant the jury must find that the parties in good
faith believed in the validity of the license. But because good faith was
not mentioned in the opinion it is difficult to define what was meant by
"apparent compliance." If it meant that parties relying on a public of-
ficial, or one professing to be such, and complying with all those formali-
ties which they in good faith believed necessary were legally married, the
proposition seems logical, just, and most practical, and applicable to a
36. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 105 (West 1952).
37. McDonald v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 73 F. Supp. 198, 200 (W.D. La. 1947).
38. State v. Eden, 350 Mo. 932, 169 S.W.2d 342 (1943).
39. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.040 (5) (1952).
40. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.040 (1) (1952).
41. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.040 (6) (1952).
.649
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provision for return and recordation of the marriage certificate and
license.
However, the Missouri court's use of "apparent compliance" might
be subject to a different interpretation. The court emphasized that the
abolition of common law marriage was aimed at eliminating noncere-
monial marriage. If, because of this, apparent compliance were construed
to mean substantial compliance, this would indicate that the issue is simply
which requirement is important and which is not-a value judgment. As
exemplified by the preceding case decided under Louisiana law, such an
approach decides the essentiality of the provision before the court but
does not seem to offer an illuminating legal approach to the entire body
of marriage statutes.
The Indiana provision disavowing invalidity because of lack of
authority in the officiant could be found to support the former and more
useful interpretation of apparent compliance. The problem would be to
find good faith implied in the statute since it is nowhere expressed. This
obstacle, however, would not be insurmountable. Good faith means that
the parties, or one of them, fully believe that they have been lawfully
joined in marriage. The Indiana statutes declare that marriage is a civil
contract, i.e., it is consensual.42 It could, therefore, be found that where
both parties know that their marriage should be solemnized by a clergy-
man or a public official and, nevertheless, cause it to be solemnized by
a mere acquaintance, neither of them can fully believe in the lawfulness
of the marriage. And if they do not believe in the lawfulness of the
marriage, they cannot be said to have mutually consented to a legal mar-
riage. Thus, good faith may be implied and held to be a part of the
Indiana statute's provision that the marriage "be legal in other respects."43
The practical objection to holding a marriage void because the of-
ficiant did not return the marriage certificate and license is that, al-
though such act is part of the marriage formalities, compliance rests
solely outside the control of the parties to the marriage. The problem, as
has been illustrated, lies not in recognizing such objection but in putting
it into a convincing legal argument.
The Indiana provisions relating to licensing formalities may be
placed in three categories. Class I relates to the provision stating that
the parties "shall provide a license to marry."4  Class II includes those
substantive provisions compliance with which is a condition precedent to
42. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-101 (1952).
43. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-301 (1952). The proviso clause reads in its entirety:
"Provided, That no marriage, legal in other respects, shall be void on account of the
incapacity of the person solemnizing the same." (Emphasis added.)
44. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-201 (a) (Supp. 1957).
NOTES
the issuance of a license, i.e., the premarital blood test45 and parental con-
sent to the marriage of a minor." Administrative provisions pertaining
to the license constitute Class III. These include place of issuance, wait-
ing period before issuance, expiration, and persons to whom the statute
states there is to be no issuance.
7
Non-compliance is also subject to classification: non-compliance by
an official versus non-compliance by the marital parties or one of them.
Furthermore, non-compliance by the parties may arise in a context of
good faith or bad faith. The effect of good faith conduct by the marital
parties is, of course, not limited to one class of requirements. Moreover,
it may take effect in several ways. It is obviously difficult to estimate
its intangible influence when a court is called upon to decide whether a
statute is to be interpreted as directory or mandatory. As part of a legal
rationale, good faith may operate to excuse non-compliance with a ba-
sically mandatory statute through the doctrine of apparent compliance or
estoppel of one party against the other.48
As to Class I, the Indiana statute states that "before any persons
shall be joined in marriage they shall produce a license to marry .... ,"
The essentiality of compliance with this provision in order for a mar-
riage to be valid is by no means clear. In Illinois a marriage duly solem-
nized is not void for want of a license."0 The Illinois court construed as
directory the provision that a license must be obtained by all persons
about to be married. 1 Its rationale was that unless a statute expressly
declares that a marriage contracted without compliance with its require-
ments is a nullity, the statute will be construed to be directory only, and
the marriage will be held valid. The court's opinion may be criticized
on two grounds. First, the court limited its attention to the statute
specifically dealing with the procurement of a license. Another statute
provides that a common law marriage contracted after 1905 is null and
void unless after the common law status is contracted a license is ob-
45. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-213 (Supp. 1957).
46. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-202 (Supp. 1957).
47. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 44-201 (a) (place of issuance), (b) (expiration), (c)
(waiting period), -207 (no issuance) (Supp. 1957).
48. A case illustrative of the various possible effects of good faith is DePotty v.
DePotty, 226 Ark. 881, 295 S.W.2d 330 (1956). The majority opinion seems consider-
ably influenced by the equities of the case and finds the statute directory. The con-
curring opinion seems to indicate that the statute should be held mandatory with good
faith excusing noncompliance. The dissent does not seem to question the result in the
case but states that the statute is mandatory and its harsh result should be escaped in the
particular case by estoppel.
49. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-201 (Supp. 1957).
50. Haderaski v. Haderaski, 415 Ill. 118, 112 N.E.2d 714 (1953).
51. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 89, § 6 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
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tained and a ceremony performed.5 2  This would clearly seem to make
the license essential to a valid marriage. If the court is saying that the
former statute (construed as directory) applies to two single persons in-
tending to be married whereas the latter statute (clearly mandatory)
applies to two persons who have already contracted the common law
status, then the court is assigning an absurd intent to the legislature.
Not only is such a distinction illogical, but it raises the issue of denial of
equal protection by unreasonable classification. Secondly, the directory
concept, in the terms used by the Illinois court, is a rule of construction
to be utilized by courts where the legislature has not clearly expressed its
intention to take away a common law right." Since the Illinois legisla-
ture has expressly stated its intention to take away the common law right,
there is no need to-and the court should not-apply the rule.5"
It, of course, does not follow that if the rationale of the Illinois
court is weak, a license must necessarily be an essential requirement in
Indiana. The licensing provision could be construed as directory be-
cause of an interpretation of the legislature's policy directive, even though
not because of the rule of construction. The Missouri Supreme Court
suggested this approach when it stated that the purpose of the Missouri
statute abolishing common law marriage was to eliminate non-ceremonial
52. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 89, § 4 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
53. The directory-mandatory rule of construction as applied to statutes pertaining
to the marriage contract found its classic expression in Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76,
78 (1877), when the court in construing the law of Michigan stated:
Statutes in many of the States, it is true, regulate the mode of entering
into the contract, but they do not confer the right. Hence they are not within
the principle, that, where a statute creates a right and provides a remedy for
its enforcement, the remedy is exclusive. No doubt, a statute may take
away a common-law right; but there is always a presumption that the
legislature has no such intention, unless it be plainly expressed. . . . Such
formal provisions may be construed as merely directory. unless they
contain express words of nullity.
54. The application of the rule in most other jurisdictions of the United States is
consistent with this conceptual framework. Its use in Louisiana is conceptually uncertain
in denying the essentiality of obtaining a license, Holmes v. Holmes, 6 La. 463 (1834),
Succession of Gibson, 186 La. 723, 173 So. 185 (1937), because it is not clear why a
ceremony is essential in the first instance, In. re Raphael, 117 La. 967, 42 So. 470 (1906).
While Furth v. Furth, 97 Ark. 272, 133 S.W. 1037 (1911) held a ceremony essential to
a valid marriage because statutes regulating the contracting of marriage had existed
in the territory at the time the common law was adopted, DePotty v. DePotty, 226
Ark. 881, 295 S.W.2d 330 (1956), sustaining by the directory rule the validity of a
marriage contracted without procuring a license in Arkansas, can be explained by the
fact that no statute requiring a license was in force in the territory at the time the
common law was adopted. The use of the directory rule by those states which have
abolished common law marriage by expressly declaring a marriage to be a nullity in the
absence of compliance with specific requirements is consistent with the view that the
common law has been superseded only in so far as the statutes have expressly provided.
See Appendix.
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marriage." It would follow not as a rule of construction but as a logical
inference that had the legislature intended that a marriage be void for
failure to procure a license, a requirement with which it was not pri-
marily concerned, it would have so stated." The problem in applying
such a construction to the Indiana statute is that the basic proposition of
intent to eliminate non-ceremonial marriage must itself be inferred. Since
no legislative -history is available to the court, this inference must be
drawn solely from the fact that historically the ceremony has been the
distinguishing feature of formal marriage.
Reference should also be made to the marriage evasion provision of
the present Indiana statutes 7 which states that where residents of Indiana
have their marriage solemnized in another state with the intent to evade
Indiana's license application laws"8 and return to reside in Indiana, the
marriage is void. Before this is interpreted to mean that a license is
essential to a valid marriage in Indiana, it should be noted that the eva-
sion provision only applies to persons acting in "bad faith." Hence, it
could be said that the statute requires good faith as to the procurement
of a license. No other state has injected good faith into the requirement
of a license,"5 but then no other state has an evasion provision worded
like that of Indiana.60
If procurement of a license is found by the Indiana courts to be es-
sential to a valid marriage, the courts will then have to determine the
55. State v. Eden, 350 Mo. 932, 169 S.W.2d 342 (1943).
56. In State v. Eden, id., the problem was that the license had been issued by an
unauthorized official. Had the court carried its initial statement to the conclusion that
a license was not essential, the question of who had issued it would have been immaterial.
However, the court's argument changed to one of apparent compliance. See text accom-
panying note 41 supra. Although the two approaches would have reached the same
result in the Missouri case, they are distinguishable. If a statute is held directory, no
consequences of invalidity follow noncompliance. However, if a statute is held to
require apparent compliance, noncompliance in bad faith would result in invalidity.
57. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-209 (1952).
58. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 44-205 (1952), 44-207 (Supp. 1957). Section 44-205 sets
out the method of making application for a license. Section 44-207 states the persons
to whom the issuance of a license is to be refused.
59. However, it was suggested by the concurring opinion in DePotty v. DePotty,
226 Ark. 881, 295 S.W.2d 330 (1956). There have been very few reported cases in
which a marriage has been solemnized in good faith without a license. In addition
to the DePotty case, see Haderaski v. Haderaski, 415 Ill. 118, 112 N.E.2d 714 (1953)
(both cases holding the license requirement to be directory).
60. The UNIFORM MARRIAGE EVAsIoN AcT, adopted by Illinois, Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, Vermont, and Wisconsin before its withdrawal from the active list of uniform
acts, states in section one: "If any person residing and intending to continue to reside
in this state who is disabled or prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws
of this state shall go into another state or country and there contract a marriage pro-
hibited and declared by the laws of this state, such marriage shall be null and void
for all purposes in this state with the same effect as though such prohibited marriage
had been entered into in this state."
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essentiality of compliance with the Class II and Class III provisions. Of
course, if procurement of a license is held to be directory, the Class II
provisions relating to parental consent, and all the Class III provisions
will also be directory since they are written either as conditions precedent
to the issuance of a license or as administrative regulations pertaining
to the license.
Within the Class II category, the Indiana statutes provide that any
person intending to marry be examined for the presence of syphilis and
that the clerk accept no application for a marriage license unless it be
accompanied by a report from a physician stating that the applicant is
not infected with the disease in a transmissible form."' A similar Illinois
provision has been held directory on the basis of the absence of express
words of nullity, 2 the same theory which was criticized above. In Ne-
braska, in order to procure a license one of the marital parties made an
affidavit that he did not have a venereal disease. The statement was false
and known to be such by both parties. The Nebraska court held that
wrongfully procuring a license did not affect the validity of the marriage
in the absence of express statutory invalidation. 3 This rationale was
persuasive since the Nebraska statutes merely stated that a marriage con-
tracted without some sort of license and ceremony was void.64 This pre-
cluded the possibility of informal marriage without an express statement
that common law marriage was void. Thus, the court was still able to
say that "every marriage statute is to be interpreted in harmony with the
common law theretofore existing and as superseding it only to the extent
required by its express terms or necessary operation.""3  Under the same
reasoning a like result was reached in the Iowa court where common law
marriage is recognized.66
The Indiana statutes further provide that "in the event the female
applicant for a license to marry is under eighteen [18] years of age, or
the male applicant is under twenty-one [21] years of age, the license can-
not be issued unless the application for the license is accompanied by"
61. INn. ANN. STAT. § 44-213 (Supp. 1957).
62. Boysen v. Boysen, 301 Ill. App. 573, 23 N.E.2d 231 (1939).
63. Christensen v. Christensen, 144 Neb. 763, 14 N.W.2d 613 (1944). Nebraska
has in addition to the license qualification a statute which provides that no person
affected with venereal disease shall marry to which the attention of the court was also
directed in upholding the marriage. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-102 (1943). The court held
that at most the marriage was voidable for fraud, but even that failed because the
plaintiff was not an innocent party.
64. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-104 (1943).
65. Christensen v. Christensen, 144 Neb. 763, 767, 14 N.W.2d 613, 615 (1944).
66. In re Stopps' Estate, 244 Iowa 931, 57 N.W.2d 221 (1953). The Alabama court,
also recognizing common law marriage, reached the same result in Woodward Iron Co.
v. Dean, 217 Ala. 530, 117 So. 52 (1928).
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the written consent of the parents of, or one in loco parentis to, the
minor."7 The Illinois statute pertaining to parental consent is written
in terms of the capacity of minors to contract marriage rather than in
terms of the issuance of a license.6" It has been held directory, again on
the basis of the absence of express words of nullity. 9 The parental con-
sent requirement has been held directory on like grounds by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia."° But there, as in Nebraska, the doctrine
is conceptually sound. Informal marriage became impossible in Virginia
as a result of inference from express exceptions to invalidity regarding
the license and ceremony, and not as a result of a blanket abolition of the
common law right to marry informally.7
Emotional reaction to holding a marriage void because of non-
compliance with statutory formalities might be expected to be most pro-
nounced in regard to the Class III provisions. Indiana statutes prescribe
that the marriage license is to be procured from the clerk of the circuit
court of the county in which either of the marital parties resides.72 It is
to be issued on the third calendar day following the date of application 3
and expires sixty days after issuance." The license is not to be issued
to certain persons of unsound mental, physical, or financial condition.75
Non-compliance with the statutes may also result from omissions or
irregularities of form either in the application for a license or the license
itself.7 1 Judicial determination that compliance with these provisions is
essential to the validity of marriage seems uncalled for, both because of
their technical administrative nature and because the marital parties are
often unaware of the non-compliance. Defects in compliance are likely
to arise from errors by public officials. Even non-compliance by the
parties, such as marrying after a license has expired, is more likely to be
the result of carelessness than an intent to evade the provision relating to
67. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-202 (Supp. 1957).
68. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 89, § 3 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
69. Reifschneider v. Reifschneider, 241 Ill. 92, 89 N.E. 255 (1909) (the first
reported case to use the directory doctrine after the abolition of common law marriage)
People v. Reynolds, 217 Ill. App. 577 (1920).
70. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-48, -49 (1950), Needam v. Needam, 183 Va. 681, 33
S.E.2d 288 (1945).
71. Of field v. Davis, 100 Va. 250, 40 S.E. 910 (1902).
72. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-201 (a) (Supp. 1957). The section also provides that
nonresidents of Indiana are to procure the license in the county in which the ceremony
is to be performed.
73. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-201 (c) (Supp. 1957).
74. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-201 (b) (Supp. 1957).
75. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-207 (Supp. 1957).
76. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-205 (1952). The requirements listed do not purport to
be a complete catalogue of all those statutory provisions which might be included in
Class III. However, they are typical of the class.
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an additional blood test.
Although there is no body of decisions in any single jurisdiction
which has dealt with all such provisions, the approach to any one of the
provisions is susceptible of application to them all. Illinois has again met
the question of essentiality by holding that the provision as to place of
issuance of a license is directory in the absence of express words of nul-
lity, even where the applicant's statement of residence to the clerk was
fraudulent.7" On the same problem, the Attorney General of New Mexico
was of the opinion that such a provision was directory because the law
was probably enacted for the convenience of the parties contracting mar-
riage."8 However, the New Mexico provision directs that the license
be issued in the county in which it is desired that the ceremony be per-
formed."0 Where, as in Indiana, the statute provides that the license be
procured in the county in which one of the parties resides, although the
ceremony may be performed and the license and certificate recorded in
any county, the element of notice to other parties, i.e., parents, would
seem inherent in the law.8" If this be true, the Indiana provision is more
of a burden than a convenience for parties intending to contract marriage,
and it would assume significance.
The doctrines of substantial compliance and apparent compliance,
previously discussed,8' are applicable to the Class III provisions, but the
difference in their approaches and results should be emphasized. When
substantial compliance is used as a standard by the court, the entire body
of marriage provisions is compared to the actual conduct of the marital
parties, and it is then decided whether their conduct substantially com-
plies with the marriage law as a whole. 2 It follows that where substan-
tial compliance is found, the provision with which the parties failed to
comply is, in effect, found to be directory. It would seem that the basis
for the result is the court's value judgment of what is and what is not
important. On the other hand, apparent compliance which involves good
faith reliance on a public official is an excuse for failure to comply with
77. People v. Reynolds, 217 Il1. App. 577 (1920). As to the equities in the factual
context, it is interesting to note that the action was the crime of wife-abandonment,
basic to which, of course, was the validity of the marriage.
78. 1931-1932 N.M. Awrr'Y. GEN. R P. 98.
79. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-10 (1953).
80. Since the license application must be recorded under IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-205
(1952), there would seem to be a close analogy to the historical marriage banns. See
35 Am. JuR. Marriage § 24 (1941). A more equitable distribution of license fees would
hardly seem to be the purpose.
81. Substantial compliance and apparent compliance are discussed in text accom-
panying note 37 supra.
82. See McDonald v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 73 F. Supp. 198 (W.D. La. 1947).
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a provision which is basically mandatory.83 The attention of the court
is focused on the particular requirement in question. And if a marriage
is held valid, such a result does not mean that non-compliance is im-
material, but that non-compliance is excusable under certain conditions.
The Indiana courts, as noted earlier, 4 might encounter difficulty in
finding the conceptual foundation of apparent compliance in the existing
law since the Indiana statutes nowhere mention good faith. Because it
is undefined this theory of substantial compliance encounters no such
conceptual obstacles in the present Indiana statutes. The problem would
be to find that it is an articulated theory at all, since in the marriage
field it seems to be based solely on a value judgment by the court."
If the Indiana courts were to adopt a rigorous interpretation of the
essentials to a valid formal marriage by interpreting the licensing and
ceremonial provisions as mandatory, the courts still have available tech-
niques by which to alleviate the harshness in particular applications.
Estoppel was used by the Tennessee Court of Appeals to uphold a mar-
riage in which, contrary to law, the ceremony had been performed in a
county other than the one in which the license had been issued.8 6 Estoppel
was erected against the heirs of the decedent who were claiming against
decedent's wife in the administration of the estate. The heirs had ad-
mitted the validity of the marriage in the pleadings of a prior action, and
the court stated that they were estopped by that proceeding to deny the
validity of the marriage in the instant action. This would seem to be a
technical estoppel by record which is seldom found on the basis of plead-
ings." But the court further stated that the husband could not have
denied the validity of his marriage, and this appears to be an estoppel in
pais with the heirs being bound because in privity with the ancestor.8
The ultimate basis of the decision was clear, however, when the court said
simply, "[T]he equities are with the defendant." 9  And no doubt the
prevention of injustice is the foundation of estoppel.9"
Although there is by no means universal agreement that the parties
to a void marriage may be estopped, as against each other, to attack its
83. See State v. Eden, 350 Mo. 932, 169 S.W.2d 342 (1943).
84. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
85. In the field of corporation law the doctrine of substantial compliance has
acquired more definite legal standards and is much used. See 13 Am. JUR. Corporations
§§ 34, 1314 (1938).
86. Douglas v. Douglas, 6 Tenn. App. 12 (1927).
87. See 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 7 (1942).
88. See 19 Am. Jim. Estoppel § 155 (1939).
89. Douglas v. Douglas, 6 Tenn. App. 12, 17 (1927).
90. 19 Am. Jim. Estoppel § 4 (1939).
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validity,9 ' the doctrine appears as sound in preventing injustice in the
area of marriage law as in any other field of law. The result of the use
of estoppel would not be the resurrection of common law marriage.
Estoppel would be applied to the particular factual situation before the
court, not to instances of informal marriages generally. The principal
danger to be avoided would be in its careless and indiscriminate use. 2
To avoid harshness in the requirement of proof of a formal mar-
riage courts have generally raised a presumption of a valid marriage from
evidence of cohabitation and reputation. 3 When by statute common law
marriage was abolished, the Missouri court held that the statute which
changed the procedure of contracting a legal marriage did not change the
rules of evidence as to proving a legal marriage. 4 The presumption is
analogous to the presumption of innocence in criminal law and is found
throughout history in terms of a presumption of legality."
The abolition of common law marriage in Indiana, in addition to
creating doubt as to the formalities essential to a valid statutory mar-
riage, has assured at least one unjust result under the statutes relating to
the capacity of persons to marry. As presented to the Indiana courts the
problem will be whether a marriage may be sustained which was con-
tracted in accordance with the statutory formalities, but to which an im-
pediment unknown to the parties and later removed existed at the time
of solemnization. Under the Indiana statutes a marriage is void when
either of the parties has a husband or wife living at the time the marriage
is contracted, or when either party is insane." Prior to January 1, 1958,
when the parties had acted throughout in good faith, the Indiana Su-
91. 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 38 (1948).
92. Even where proper grounds for estoppel exist, inadequate judicial analysis may
weaken the argument or create too broad a precedent. In DePotty v. Depotty, 226 Ark.
881, 295 S.W.2d 330 (1956), the doctrine of estoppel had merit under the facts of the
case. The dissenting opinion did not develop it but suggested rather that "some sort of
estoppel" be set up.
93. Thomson v. Thomson, 236 Mo. App. 1223, 163 S.W.2d 792 (1942); Dunbarton
v. Franklin, 19 N.H. 257 (1848) ; In re McLaughlin's Estate, 4 Wash. 570, 30 Pac. 651
(1892). See 35 Am. Jim. Marriage § 200 (1941).
94. Thomson v. Thomson, 236 Mo. App. 1223, 163 S.W.2d 792 (1942).
95. The presumption has been attacked by commentators on Louisiana law as
aproaching a recognition of common law marriage. Comment, 24 Tur. L. Rxv. 217,
230 (Dec. 1949). By analogy to the French Civil Code it is argued that the best evidence
rule should apply, and secondary evidence should not be admitted until distruction or loss
of the marriage records has been proved. However, the presumption does not seem to
approach very near a recognition of common law marriage since it is rebuttable. The
significant position of marriage in society would seem to justify the relaxation of the
best evidence rule.
96. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-104 (1952). These are the only two conditions affecting
capacity to marry which are removable. Nonremovable impediments include con-
sanguinity, IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-101 (Supp. 1957), -102, -105 (1952), and miscegenation,
IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-104, -105 (1952).
preme Court presumed a valid common law marriage from the cohabita-
tion and reputation of the parties subsequent to the removal of the im-
pediment."7  Today there is no common law marriage. With one excep-
tion, in all states which have terminated recognition of common law
marriage the result has followed, in the absence of statutory intervention,
that marriages void by reason of an impediment continue void although
the impediment is later removed, unless a second marriage is contracted
according to statutory formalities.98 This is true regardless of the good
faith of the parties. Thus, a man who hears a court decree that his wife
is divorced from him and, relying on the decree, marries again, may find
when his second wife dies that he was not married to her at all if his first
wife's divorce was never formally entered of record as a result of the
court costs not having been paid. This would follow although his first
wife without his knowledge had obtained a later divorce.9" Such a result
seems unreasonably harsh, yet it is the product of sound formal logic.
The only jurisdiction whose courts have reached a contrary result is
Tennessee, but even there the authority is not clear."' 0 The courts have
written in terms indicating that the marriage was ratified by the conduct
of the parties subsequent to the removal of the impediment,"' a theory
generally applied only to voidable marriages. The presumption of va-
lidity and estoppel have been used frequently by the Tennessee courts in
cases involving formal defects to a marriage and are, therefore, well de-
veloped tools which the courts might have applied in the impediment
cases. 1 2  None of these tools has been developed by the Indiana courts
in the field of marriage law.
Partial relief from the harshness of invalidity may be found in
97. Eddington v. Eddington, 213 Ind. 347, 12 N.E.2d 758 (1938); Langdon v.
Langdon, 204 Ind. 321, 183 N.E. 400 (1932); Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129 (1884).
The Appellate Court of Indiana has failed to uphold marriages in which at the time
of the ceremony one of the parties had a spouse living and undivorced although the
impediment was latter removed. Simms v. Kirk, 81 Ind. App. 515, 144 N.E. 146 (1924);
Compton v. Benham, 44 Ind. App. 51, 85 N.E. 365 (1908). However, in each of
these cases good faith was notably absent in at least one of the parties.
98. Wilson v. Cook, 256 IIl. 460, 100 N.E. 222 (1912) ; Baker v. Baker, 222 Minn.
169, 23 N.W.2d 582 (1946); Binger v. Binger, 158 Neb. 444, 63 N.W.2d 784 (1954);
Scott v. Scott, 153 Neb. 906, 46 N.W.2d 627 (1951); Dacunzo v. Edgye, 19 N.J. 443,
117 A.2d 508 (1955).
99. On facts similar to these the court was able to uphold the second marriage
by presuming a common law marriage in Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129 (1884).
100. The position that Tennessee is an exception to the general rule of invalidity
in jurisdictions which do not recognize common law marriage was adopted in Note,
3 VAND. L. REv. 610, 616 (1950). No exceptions were recognized in Note, 29 NOTME
DAmE LAW. 80, 93 (1953).
101. Perry v. Sun Coal Co., 183 Tenn. 141, 191 S.W.2d 181 (1945); McReynolds
v. State, 45 Tenn. 18 (1867).
102. See cases collected and analyzed in Note, 3 VAND. L. REv. 610 (1950).
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equity. Under a quasi-partnership theory the Indiana Supreme Court
allowed an equitable division of property acquired during a void mar-
riage."' The impediment to the marriage was consanguinity, but the
property result would be clearly applicable in the case of an impediment
later dissolved.
The preceding discussion of the essential formalities to a valid mar-
riage in Indiana reflects the difficulty of arriving at an authoritative in-
terpretation of the simple statement that common law marriage has been
abolished in its relation to statutes already in existence. As a policy di-
rective becomes more vague, courts must necessarily resort to a greater
extent to their own value judgments not only in formulating precise legal
rules for the factual situation in litigation, but in determining the ulti-
mate goal of the policy itself. Several factors might be expected to in-
fluence the Indiana courts as they endeavor to clarify the legislature's
policy statement.
One such factor is the general reluctance of courts to declare a mar-
riage void because of the key status of marriage in the social order of the
United States. 0 1 This reluctance has become less articulate in recent
appellate court opinions. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of
the cases discussing Class II and III provisions have found the provi-
sions directory. Although the statutes of all other jurisdictions may be
distinguished from those of Indiana, the force of numbers alone may
have some influence on the Indiana courts.
Another factor which has historically influenced courts dealing with
the legal requirements of marriage has been the effect of illegitimacy
produced by declaring a marriage void.'0 5 However, the status of il-
legitimacy assumes less significance today since the Indiana Probate Code
states that "for the purpose of inheritance to, through and from an il-
legitimate child" he shall be treated as legitimate with certain qualifica-
tions as to the proof of the father's paternity. °6 Moreover, the Indiana
Supreme Court recently stated when declaring stringent rules for the
establishment of common law marriage that the problem of legitimacy
was one for the General Assembly, not the court."7
Of possible influence in the consideration of Class III provisions is
the emergence of a belief among legal scholars... and in judicial author-
103. Sclamberg v. Sclamberg, 220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d 801 (1942).
104. See, e.g., Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877) ; In re Love's Estate, 42 Okla.
478, 142 Pac. 305 (1914) ; In re Svendsen's Estate, 37 S.D. 353, 158 N.W. 410 (1916).
105. See Feehley v. Feehley, 129 Md. 565, 99 Atl. 663 (1916) ; Beverlin v. Beverlin,
29 W. Va. 732, 3 S.E. 36 (1887).
106. IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-207 (1953).
107. Anderson v. Anderson, 235 Ind. 113, 125, 131 N.E.2d 301, 307 (1956).
108. Hall, Ignwrance and Mistake In Criminal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1, 34-40 (1957).
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ity.°. that knowledge of the law is a requisite to individual accountability
where the law in question may be termed of a minor administrative
nature-particularly when nonfeasance constitutes the conduct in issue.
Although this position has developed primarily in the context of criminal
law, it is analogous to civil law where non-compliance may entail loss of
inheritance, workmen's compensation, social security benefits, or ali-
mony. The injection of this theory into the interpretation of the statutes
would of course raise evidentiary problems.
The large administrative organization required by the marriage
statutes suggests, as perhaps the most practical argument in favor of a
finding of validity, a resort to the proposition that ignorance of the law
is excusable where the act in question occurs in reliance on conduct of a
qualified official;11 or, stated another way, that as to the party con-
cerned the law is as the qualified official indicates it to be."' Thus, if
a careless clerk of one county were to issue a license to residents of an-
other county, the parties receiving the license in good faith would not be
penalized. This proposition supports the doctrine of apparent compli-
ance advanced by the Missouri court and would be applicable to Class II
and III provisions.
In contrast to the policy arguments favoring a finding of validity
where there is non-compliance with formalities or allowing an excuse for
non-compliance, the arguments which gave rise to the abolition of com-
mon law marriage should be considered." 2 Common law marriage found
its greatest utility in the frontier era of United States history when the
sparsely populated and far flung frontiers made it difficult, if not im-
possible, to reach government officials and clergymen.' 13 Today the
obstacles of time and distance have been removed, and it is generally
conceded that every competent person is familiar with the function of a
marriage license and ceremony. Common law marriage was attacked on
the grounds that it weakened state health control and bred spurious liti-
gation. In addition, it often was the occasion for surprising third parties
in transactions such as land conveyances. On the other hand, formal
marriage makes for clear evidence of the intent of the parties and of
their acts, and the formalities, as in ordinary contract doctrine, impress
on parties the consequences of their acts."' The Indiana Supreme Court
109. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
110. Hall, Ignorance and Mistake In Criminal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1, 23-27 (1957).
111. Ibid.
112. The basis of this brief survey is Note, Common Law Marriage - A Legal
Anachronism, 32 IND. L.J. 99 (1956), which should be consulted for a detailed discussion.
113. Id. at 102.
114. Id. at 106.
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recognized these arguments even before the General Assembly acted to
abolish common law marriage."'
Two facts should be noted at this point. The arguments in favor
of formal marriage were not concerned with the particular sanctions
which should be adopted to insure compliance with the formalities. Sec-
ondly, the arguments in favor of upholding the validity of marriage were
not concerned with the operation of the entire body of marriage require-
ments. Since the Indiana legislature has not limited the effect of its pro-
nouncement to any specific existing statutory formalities, the Indiana
courts are the only courts which have ever been clearly faced wtih the
task of reorienting the entire body of marriage law.
A ceremony must surely have been intended by the Indiana legisla-
ture to be essential to a valid marriage." 6 Moreover, no other sanction
besides invalidity is to be found to insure solemnization. With this
premise that a ceremony is essential the entire body of marriage statutes
will function efficiently without the sanction of invalidity being invoked
as to any other provision to insure compliance. The officiant is subject
to a maximum fine of five hundred dollars for solemnizing a marriage
in which the parties have not obtained a license." 7  This provision in-
directly forces the parties to procure a license since an of ficiant, knowing
he is subject to criminal sanctions, will hesitate to solemnize a marriage
without a license being presented." 8  A clerk who accepts an application
for a marriage license unaccompanied by a report of a blood test or who
issues a license to a minor without requiring the written consent of his
parents is subject to fine and imprisonment." 9 The clerk is also subject
to a criminal penalty if he knowingly issues a license to persons who do
not reside in his county or if he fails to wait three calendar days from
the date of application before issuing the license.'2 In addition, appli-
cants who procure the issuance of a license by any false statement or pre-
tense are subject to criminal penalties. 2 '
This method of effectuating a policy of formal marriage by admin-
115. Anderson v. Anderson, 235 Ind. 113, 124, 131 N.E.2d 301, 307 (1956).
116. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
117. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-211 (1952).
118. It may be argued that as a practical matter conviction of a clergyman would
be improbable. It might be answered that as a practical matter there is no danger of
noncompliance by a clergyman. Conviction of a Justice of the Peace should present
no problem.
119. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 44-213 (e) (blood test), -202 (d) (consent) (Supp. 1957).
120. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-202 (d) (Supp. 1957).
121. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-210 (1952) is the general provision but appears to have
been at least partially supplanted by § 44-202 (e) (Supp. 1957) dealing with the
requirement of parental consent and § 44-213 (e) (Supp. 1957) dealing with the report
of blood test.
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istrative control and criminal sanctions against the person (whether cere-
monial of ficiant, license clerk, or marriage applicant) who is in the best
position to insure compliance with a particular formality seems rational
and clear. It also serves to illustrate the fallacy of the impression cre-
ated by judicial opinions and the connotation of the terms directory and
mandatory that unless non-compliance with a statutory provision entails
invalidity of the marriage, the provision is ineffective to compel com-
pliance. This erroneous impression results from the failure of courts
and legislatures to consider the large array of controls and sanctions
available for effectuating a given policy.'22 Methods of control include
prohibition, regulation which is administrative control, creation of pri-
vate rights, and fiscal control. Sanctions include criminal, administra-
tive, civil, and fiscal.'23 The possible combinations and overlaps of the
various controls and sanctions approaches infinity.
Where the method of effectuating the policy of formal marriage by
administrative control and criminal sanctions is clear and explicit in the
statutes, there appears to be no technical legal reason for the Indiana
courts even to consider any argument about a sanction of invalidity in
regard to the license provisions. Once it is established that a ceremony
is essential to a valid marriage, the entire body of marriage laws becomes
sensible and workable and should preclude speculation as to whether the
legislature might have impliedly intended the sanction of invalidity to
have broader application. Where the Illinois court said that the sanction
of invalidity was not to be invoked even though an infraction of the
statute entailed penalties, it would seem better to have said because an in-
fraction of the statute entailed penalties.'
Moreover, there appears to be no sound policy reason for the Indi-
ana courts to consider the sanction of invalidity in regard to the license
requirements. Basically, the marriage provisions are not a result of con-
cern for the marriage relation itself. Rather they are the result of con-
cern for particular social harms which occur with some frequency in the
conduct pattern of the marriage relation. These harms include spurious
litigation, the spread of venereal disease, and loss of parental control over
minors. If a marriage is solemnized and one or more of these social
harms results from want of compliance with the license requirements, to
declare the marriage relation to be a nullity is to compound the harm to
society-an illicit relationship in addition to the already existent social
harm. An additional practical reason for the Indiana courts to limit the
122. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 90, 91 (1938).
123. HORAcK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 176-228 (3d ed. 1954).
124. Haderaski v. Haderasld, 415 Ill. 118, 121, 112 N.E.2d 714, 715 (1953).
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.sanction of invalidity to the ceremony is that such action would place
back on the legislature the responsibility of making a more definitive
statement of policy.
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Indiana court could say that
the sanction of invalidity will not be found to have been adopted by the
legislature unless it is required by the express terms or necessary opera-
tion of the statute. This terminology is similar to the classic statement
of the directory rule as espoused by the courts of Illinois. 2' However,
it is based on sound legal construction and sound policy; it is not based on
the presumption that the common law right of marriage has not been
impaired."' 8
Finally to be considered are the available avenues for legislative
clarification. States other than Indiana which have terminated their
recognition of common law marriage by statute have attacked the prob-
lem by affirmatively stating that certain statutory formalities are essen-
tial to a valid marriage. Mississippi, which like Indiana had a statutory
provision expressly recognizing common law marriage,'2 7 recently en-
acted a law which stated that "failure in any case to comply with both
prerequisites aforesaid [procurement of a license and ceremony], which
shall be construed as mandatory and not merely directory, shall render
the purported marriage absolutely void and any children born as a result
thereof illegitimate."12 Similar statutes, although not so strongly worded
may be found in Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, and Wis-
consin." 9 A Utah statute explicitly makes a ceremony essential.' New
York statutes expressly make a ceremony essential and a license non-
essential. 31
Statutes have been enacted by several states which explicitly with-
draw the sanctions of invalidity from non-compliance with Class II and
III license provisions. The Wisconsin statute, adapted from the Uni-
form Marriage and Marriage License Act, enumerates immaterial de-
fects in great detail." 2 It lists as immaterial want of jurisdiction in the
125. See text acompanying note 51 supra.
126. Certainly obstacles exist to such an over-all examination of the marriage laws
by the Indiana courts. The infrequency and narrow limits of the cases before the courts,
the emotional influence of the particular factual situations before the courts, and hastily
considered dicta are a few of the problems.
127. Miss. CODE ANN. § 465 (1942).
128. Miss. CODE ANN. § 465.5 (1942).
129. Micx. ComP. LAWS § 551.2 (Supp. 1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01
(1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.040 (1952); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-10 (1940); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 245.12 (1957) (taken from the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND MARRIAGE Li-
CENSE AcT).
130. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1953).
131. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 11 (ceremony), § 25 (license).
132. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.34 (1957).
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license clerk; solemnization in a county other than that prescribed; omis-
sions, informalities, or irregularities of form either in the application for
a license or the license itself; incompetency of witnesses to a marriage;
false assumption of authority by an officiant; license expiration before
marriage; and issuance of a license to a minor without parental con-
sent. 3 The statute states that these defects do not render a marriage
void when the parties or either of them fully believe that they have been
lawfully married. Although this provision has not been interpreted by
the Wisconsin courts, the Commissioners' Note to the Uniform Ac' 4
states that it is intended that a violation of these requirements should
make a marriage voidable oidy as the statutes of each state provide, gen-
erally for fraud, duress, or coercion.
A broader policy statement has been announced by the California
legislature: "Marriage must be licensed, solemnized, authenticated, and
the certificate of registry of marriage filed as provided in this article;
but non-compliance with its provisions by others than a party to a mar-
riage does not invalidate it.""' This statute is in theory very similar to
the doctrine of apparent compliance. The marriage applicant must have
acted throughout in good faith. If the applicant has actively or pas-
sively acquiesced in non-compliance by another, the non-compliance be-
comes that of the marriage applicant as well. If the Indiana legislature
should decide that certain listed requirements are essential to a valid mar-
riage, this type statute would establish a clear policy directive with flexi-
bility in application.
Statutes have also been enacted to correct particularly inequitable
situations and to foster compliance with the law. Persons living together
as man and wife without having complied with the statutory formalities
may desire to make legal their union. Others may suddenly discover that
an impediment existed at the time of their formal marriage but has since
been removed. In either situation the publicity involved in obtaining and
having recorded a marriage license would be a serious obstacle to induc-
133. Parental consent has been dealt with separately by several states. In Arkan-
sas if consent is not given, the court of chancery may set the marriage aside on applica-
tion of the parents. ARx. STAT. ANN. § 55-102 (1947). In New Hampshire in order
for minors to marry they and their parents must petition a court for permission. N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:6 (1955). In the absence of permission the superior court may
annul the marriage at the suit of the minor or his parents unless the minor has con-
firmed the marriage after reaching his majority. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:5 (1955).
In North Carolina when a minor procures a license by misrepresentation, his parents
may annul the marriage. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-2 (1950).
134. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND MARRIAGE LICENSE AcT § 23 (1911) (found in 9
UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 473, 474 (1942) (superseded)).
135. CAL. CIv. CODE § 68. Failure of a minister to record a marriage did not in-
validate it in re Cooper's Estate, 97 Cal. App. 2d 186, 217 P.2d 499 (1950).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ing the parties to contract a- formal marriage. The California legislature
met these situations by providing that "when unmarried persons, not
minors, have been living together as man and wife, they may, without a
license be married by any clergyman."' 36  The statute further provides
that a certificate of marriage must be made out by the clergyman and
delivered to the parties and must be entered upon the record of the
church.' Recognizing that greater injustice results in invalidating a
marriage after one of the parties has died than when they are both living
and able to correct a defect, the New Hampshire legislature has provided
that informal marriage will be recognized as valid when parties have
cohabited, acknowledging each other as husband and wife, and have been
generally reputed to be married for three years and until the death of onw
of them. 8' Although provisions like these are uncommon in the United
States, they are the result of commendable legislative consideration of
the practical operation of an entire body of laws.
Legislative action is clearly called for to prevent invalidation of a
marriage which was contracted in accordance with the statutory formali-
ties but to which an impediment unknown to the parties and later re-
moved existed at the time of solemnization. The statutes of California
and New Hampshire, discussed in the preceding paragraph, find possible
application here. Provisions in the statutes of Wisconsin and Massa-
chusetts,"3 9 based on the Uniform Marriage and Marriage License Act,
directly meet the problem and would serve as effective models for legis-
lative amendment in Indiana. These statutes validate marriage from the
time of the removal of the impediment where at least one of the parties
contracted the marriage in good faith and continued to cohabit with the
other in good faith after the impediment was removed. However, they
apply only to the impediment of a prior spouse living and not divorced;
there would seem to be no reason for not including insantity. These
statutes are applied without regard to whether the parties to the disputed
marriage are living or dead.
APPENDIX
]ESSENTIAL STATUTORY FORMALITIES IN OTHER STATES*
COMMON LAW MARRIAGE RECOGNIZED
136. CAL. CIV. CODE § 79.
137. CAL. CIV. CODE § 79. For a discussion of this statute see Encinas v. Lowthian
Freight Lines, 69 Cal. App. 2d 156, 158 P.2d 575 (1945).
138. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (1955). See De Lisle v. Smalley, 95 N.H.
314, 63 A.2d 240 (1949). This would allow, of course, the evidentiary problem to arise
again in workmen's compensation cases.
139. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.35 (1957) ; MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 207, § 6 (1955).
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Cavin v. Cavin, 273 Ala. 185, 185 So.
741 (1939); Tartt v. Negus, 127 Ala.
301, 28 So. 713 (1900).
Moffat Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
108 Colo. 388, 118 P.2d 769 (1941);
Klipfel's Estate v. Klipfel, 41 Colo. 40,
92 Pac. 26 (1907).
Budd v. J.Y. Gooch Co., 157 Fla. 716, 27
So. 2d 72 (1946); Warren v. Warren,
66 Fla. 138, 63 So. 726 (1913).
Drawdy v. Hesters, 130 Ga. 161, 60 S.E.
451 (1908); Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga.
173 (1860).
In re Stopps' Estate, 244 Iowa 931, 57
N.W.2d 221 (1953); Blanchard v. Lam-
bert, 43 Iowa 228 (1876).
Whetstone v. Whetstone, 178 Kan. 595,
290 P.2d 1022 (1955); State v. Walker,
36 Kan. 297, 13 Pac. 279 (1887).
Umbenhower v. Lobus, 85 Ohio St. 238,
97 N.E. 832 (1912).
Quinton v. Webb, 207 Okla. 133, 248
P.2d 586 (1952); In re Love's Estate,
42 Okla. 478, 142 Pac. 305 (1914).
Holgate v. United Elec. Rys. Co., 47
R.I. 337, 133 AtI. 243 (1926).
State v. Ward, 204 S.C. 210, 28 S.E.2d
785 (1944) (statute obviates necessity of
license); James v. Mickey, 26 S.C. 270,
2 S.E. 130 (1887).
In re Erickson's Estate, 75 S.D. 345, 64
N.W.2d 316 (1954); In re Svendsen's
Estate, 37 S.D. 353, 158 N.W. 410
(1916) (also statutory authorization).
Williams v. White, 263 S.W.2d 666
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Holder v. State,




Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 32-201, -301
(1948); Mauldin v. Sunshine Mining
Co., 61 Idaho 9, 97 P.2d 608 (1939).
Montana MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 48-101, -115
(1947); Stevens v. Woodmen of the
World, 105 Mont. 121, 71 P.2d 898
(1937); In re Huston's Estate, 48 Mont.
524, 139 Pac. 458 (1914).
Pennsylvania PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-23 (Supp.
1958); Buradus v. General Cement Pro-
ducts Co., 356 Pa. 349, 52 A.2d 205
(1947).
COMMON LAW MARRIAGE NOT RECOGNIZED (C = ceremony, L - li-
cense, "Essentials" include only those named explicitly by statute or court)
1. Statute Declaring Status Alone Null and Void.
State Essentials Authority
Illinois C ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 89, § 4 (Smith-Hurd
1956); Haderaski v. Haderaski, 415 Ill.
118, 112 N.E.2d 714 (1953); People v.






Explicitly Making Certain Requirements Essential.
Essentials Authority
C,L ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-111 (1956);
Levy v. Blakely, 41 Ariz. 327, 18 P.2d
263 (1933).
C Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (1955).
Common Law marriage is recognized in
Workmen's Compensation Law. Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.080 (1955); Gil-
bert v. Gilbert, 275 Ky. 559, 122 S.W.2d
137 (1938) ; Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Tac-
kett, 243 Ky. 694, 49 S.W.2d 571 (1932).
C LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 88 (West
1952); Succession of Gibson, 186 La.
723, 173 So. 185 (1937); In re Raphael,
117 La. 967, 42 So. 470 (1906); Holmes












C,L Mich. Public Acts 1956, No. 44.
C,L MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (1947);
Baker v. Baker, 222 Minn. 169, 23 N.W.
2d 582 (1946).
C,L Miss. CODE ANN. § 465.5 (1942).
C,L Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.040 (1952); State
(uncertain) v. Eden, 350 Mo. 932, 169 S.W.2d 342
(1943); Rone's Estate v. Rone, 218
S.W.2d 138 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949).
C,L NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-104 (1943); Col-
lins v. Hoag & Rollins, Inc., 122 Neb.
805, 241 N.W. 766 (1932).
C NEV. REV. STAT. § 122.010 (1957).
C,L N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-10 (1940); Da-
cunzo v. Edgye, 19 N.J. 443, 117 A.2d
508 (1955).
C N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 11; Adams v.
Adams, 188 Miss. 381, 67 N.Y.S.2d 752
(Sup. Ct. 1946).
C UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1953); In
re Vetas' Estate, 110 Utah 187, 170 P.2d
183 (1946); Schurler v. Industrial
Comm., 86 Utah 284, 43 P.2d 696
(1935).
C,L WIs. STAT. ANN. § 245.12 (1957) ; In re
Van Schaick's Estate, 256 Wis. 214, 40
N.W.2d 588 (1949).







C DePotty v. DePotty, 226 Ark. 881, 295
S.W.2d 330 (1956); Furth v. Furth, 97
Ark. 272, 133 S.W. 1037 (1911).
C Commonwealth v. Munson, 127 459
(1879).
C In re Gabaldon's Estate, 38 N.M. 392, 34
P.2d 672 (1934).
C Morrill v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1 (1895).
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4. Abrogation of Common Law Implied from Statute Covering Whole
Subject Matter.
Essentials Authority
C,L(dictum) Huard v. Mc Teigh, 113 Ore. 279, 232
Pac. 658 (1925).
C In re Roberts' Estate, 58 Wyo. 438, 133
P.2d 492 (1943) (also stating two other
grounds for holding).










C,L Norman v. Norman, 121 Cal. 620, 54
Pac. 143 (1898).
C State ex rel. Felson v. Allen, 129 Conn.
427, 29 A.2d 306 (1942).
C Schumacher v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
23 N.D. 231, 136 N.W. 85 (1912).
C,L 115 Tenn. 12, 89 S.W. 392 (1905); Ba-
shaw v. State, 9 Tenn. 177 (1829).
C,L Offield v. Davis, 100 Va. 250, 40 S.E.
910 (1902).
C In re Mc Laughlin's Estate, 4 Wash. 570,
30 Pac. 651 (1892).
C,L Kisla v. Kisla, 124 W. Va. 220, 19 S.E.
2d 609 (1942); Beverlin v. Beverlin, 29
W. Va. 732, 3 S.E. 36 (1887).
Essentials Authority
C In re Pearsons' Estate, 44 Del. 406, 59
A.2d 709 (1948) ; Wilmington Trust Co.
v. Hendrixson, 31 Del. 303, 114 Atl. 215
(1921).
C Knapp v. Knapp, 149 Md. 263, 131 Atl.
329 (1925) ; Feehley v. Feehley, 129 Md.
565, 99 Atl. 663 (1916); Denison v.
Denison, 35 Md. 361 (1872) (stating
two alternative grounds for holding). A
recent opinion has called the statutes man-
datory and may lead to a conflict with the
Feehley case. Henderson v. Henderson,









North Carolina C Wooley v. Bruton, 184 N.C. 438, 114
S.E. 628 (1922); State v. Wilson, 121
N.C. 650, 28 S.E. 416 (1897); State v.







Dunbarton v. Franklin, 19 N.H. 257
(1848). Common law marriage is now
recognized to a limited extent. N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (1955), De
Lisle v. Smalley, 95 N.H. 314, 63 A.2d
240 (1949).
* There is no authority from which a conclusion may be drawn regarding Maine's
position as to common law marriage.
